

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD  
DIVISION OF JUDGES

SCHWICKERT'S OF ROCHESTER, INC.

and

UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS, WATERPROOFERS  
AND ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 96

Cases 18-CA-16899  
18-CA-16936  
18-CA-17031

SCHWICKERT, INC.

and

UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS, WATERPROOFERS  
AND ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 96

Cases 18-CA-16900  
18-CA-16937  
18-CA-17029

*David M. Biggar, Esq., and Kristyn Myers, Esq.,*  
for the General Counsel.  
*Timothy B. Kohls, Esq.,* of Minneapolis, Minnesota,  
for the Respondent.

**DECISION**

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

MARK D. RUBIN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on February 4 and 5, 2004, based on charges filed on June 24, July 21, and October 21, 2003,<sup>1</sup> by United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers Local Union No. 96 (Charging Party or Union) against Schwickert's of Rochester, Inc. (Schwickert's Rochester) and Schwickert, Inc. (Schwickert) (jointly, Respondents).

The Regional Director's consolidated complaint, dated September 23, alleges that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by untimely and illegal withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining group, by the subsequent withdrawal of recognition from, and refusal to bargain with, the Union, and by the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, including health insurance and other fringe benefits. The complaint also alleges that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees that they would no longer have union representation, distributing prepared union resignation forms to employees, and providing postage and envelopes to employees and advising them they were to be used to mail resignations to the Union, and violated Section 8(a)(3) by constructively discharging employees Ray Oman, Brad Musel, Jerry Mundt, Ryan Augustine, and Ben Pugh.

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all dates occurred in 2003.

Respondents deny constructively discharging the five employees, deny the alleged independent 8(a)(1) violations, affirmatively maintain that the Union consented to their withdrawal from the multiemployer association, and maintain that they were entitled to unilaterally end their Section 8(f) collective-bargaining relationship with the Union after the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement. The following issues are, thus, presented by this litigation: whether the Union consented to or acquiesced in Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining; whether Respondents were entitled to withdraw their recognition of the Union pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act; whether Respondents engaged in the actions alleged to be violations of Section 8(a)(1) and whether those actions violate that Section of the Act; and whether Respondents' actions alleged to have violated Section 8(a) (1) and (5) caused the resignations and, hence, resulted in the constructive discharges of the five named employees.

At the trial, the parties were afforded a full opportunity to examine and to cross-examine witnesses, to adduce competent, relevant, and material evidence, to argue their positions orally, and to file post trial briefs. Based on the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs and oral argument of the Respondents and the General Counsel, I make the following

## Findings of Fact

### I. Jurisdiction

Respondent Schwickert's Rochester, a Minnesota corporation, maintains an office and place of business in Rochester, Minnesota, where it has been engaged as a commercial roofing contractor in the construction industry. Respondent Schwickert, a Minnesota corporation, maintains an office and place of business in Mankato, Minnesota, where it has been engaged as a mechanical and roofing contractor in the construction industry. The parent corporation of both Respondents is Schwickert's of Mankato, Inc., which, in turn, is owned by Tecta America Corporation. Both Respondents, individually, during the 12-month period preceding May 31, 2003, in conducting their business operations, purchased and received at their Minnesota places of business goods and services valued in excess of \$50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of Minnesota, and derived gross revenues in excess of \$500,000. I find, and it is admitted, that Respondents are now, and have been at all times material, employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

The Roofing Contractors of the Southeastern Minnesota Area (Association) has been an organization composed of various employers, including Respondents, engaged as roofing contractors in the construction industry, one purpose of the Association being to represent employers in negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements with the Union. During the 12-month period ending May 31, 2003, members of the Association, collectively, in conducting their businesses in the construction industry, provided services valued in excess of \$50,000 for customers located outside the State of Minnesota, and those members during that period, in conducting their business operations, purchased and received at their respective facilities in the State of Minnesota goods valued in excess of \$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Minnesota. I find that at all material times the employers represented by the Association, collectively, have been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

## II. Labor Organization

I find, and it is admitted, that the Union is, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

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## III. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

10 The Association, utilizing the bargaining services of the Sheet Metal, Air Conditioning, and Roofing Contractors Association (SMARCA), has engaged in multiemployer bargaining with the Union for over 20 years, and has entered into a series of collective-bargaining agreements with the Union, the most recent of which was effective from June 19, 1999, to May 31, 2003. During this period, Respondents have been members of the Association, and pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, have recognized the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of their roofers and waterproofers. The most recent agreement also covered contractors Winona Heating and Ventilation (Winona), Kiker Brothers Roofing (Kiker) and two or three other small contractors. Schwickert employs about 30 roofing employees, and Schwickert's Rochester has about 15 employees, including roofers.

20 About January 28, 2003, the Union sent letters to Respondents, and to Kiker and Winona, giving notice of reopening of the collective-bargaining agreement upon expiration, and enclosing designation of representation forms, by which each employer could "name another party to represent your company on your behalf, should you choose to not represent yourself." All four employers who were members of the Association completed the forms, thereby designating SMARCA as their representative for the upcoming contract negotiations. Respondents' forms were both dated February 17, 2003. Respondents, Kiker, Winona, and SMARCA met on April 8 to discuss goals and issues in the upcoming negotiations with the Union. The discussion included making a list of contract proposals, guessing what proposals the Union would be making, and the current economic conditions. Kent Schwickert, president of Respondents, represented Respondents, while Rick Kiker represented Kiker, Tom Plachecki and Roger Green represented Winona, and James Bigham, CEO of SMARCA, represented SMARCA.

35 The four Association contractors and SMARCA again met on May 14, and prepared a written contract proposal for the Union. This proposal contained all the terms and conditions of employment which the Association members desired to achieve, and was based on input from all four contractors, including Respondents, at the meetings of April 8 and May 14. Later on May 14, the Union and the Association met for the first of three collective-bargaining negotiation meetings. CEO Bigham and General Counsel John Quarnstrom represented SMARCA, Business Manager Bob Danley and Business Agent Mike Stinson represented the Union, Schwickert represented Respondents, Plachecki and Green represented Winona, and Kiker represented Kiker. At this meeting, the Union, and the Association, represented by SMARCA, exchanged proposals and discussed issues.

45 The same parties and individuals met again for bargaining on May 21. The parties discussed their proposals, but little or no progress towards an agreement occurred at this session. At the hearing, Schwickert testified that during this session he began to perceive two stumbling blocks in negotiations: that the Union didn't understand the contractors' needs, and that the individual Association members had different objectives. Similarly, Bigham testified that he began to perceive obstacles to a successful negotiation because the contractors maintained discrete positions on some of the proposals.

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The same parties and individuals met again for bargaining on May 29, but this time a Federal mediator also attended the session. All parties agreed that this day's negotiations were difficult. Business Manager Danley began the session by rejecting the Association's proposal for a change to the subcontracting language, and every time Danley made a proposal or counterproposal it was rejected by Bigham. According to Danley, Bigham was the spokesman for the Association, "but you could tell where they [the positions] were coming from." This was an apparent allusion to Danley's view that the strong positions the Association was taking were, in reality, coming from the individual Association members rather than Bigham or SMARCA. According to Danley, he felt like he "was getting hit from all sides," and "so I made an off the cuff comment to the employers and said I might as well negotiate this contract the way I do in Wisconsin." Danley, and the other attendees, understood this to mean a reference to the Union's method of bargaining with individual employers in Wisconsin, as opposed to the Association's multiemployer bargaining in Minnesota. Further, Bigham observed that Danley was visibly frustrated at the time he made the comment. Bigham sarcastically responded, "Oh yeah Bob; that really works well in Wisconsin."<sup>2</sup> Schwickert added, "We are all a team here."<sup>3</sup> Bigham further responded that individual bargaining would not be good for the "industry," and Danley agreed with him.

The May 29 bargaining continued for an hour or two after Danley's "Wisconsin" comment, and at the conclusion of the meeting Danley agreed to take the Association's offer back to the membership for a ratification vote. Upon the membership's subsequent rejection of the proposed contract, the Association and Union scheduled another bargaining session for June 6. Prior to June 6, however, Danley called Bigham and asked to cancel the meeting for personal reasons. Bigham and Danley agree to reschedule the bargaining session to June 13. During the period between June 6 and 13, Bigham had individual conversations with the representatives of the members of the Association.

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<sup>2</sup> Contrary to both Bigham and Danley, Schwickert testified that Bigham replied somewhat positively to Danley's comment by saying that it was a good idea, and "maybe we should," and that Bigham's response was genuine, not sarcastic. As in other areas of conflict, I credit Danley's testimony over Schwickert. I found Danley to be a credible witness who, generally, was responsive to questions from either side, unhesitant in responding, and forthright in his answers. Schwickert, on one occasion, changed his testimony at trial upon being shown an earlier, inconsistent affidavit, and was occasionally hesitant and not responsive to questions. Here, in particular, where Schwickert testified in contravention of both Bigham and Danley, I do not credit Schwickert's testimony that, in essence, Bigham endorsed Danley's "Wisconsin" comment.

<sup>3</sup> As to the "team" comment testified to by Danley, Schwickert denies the comment and Bigham doesn't recall Schwickert responding to either Danley's comment or Bigham's response. When asked whether, in fact, Schwickert made the "team" comment, Bigham testified, "I don't believe so." For the reasons set forth above, I credit Danley over Schwickert. For similar reasons, I credit Danley over Bigham, in areas of disputed testimony. Danley impressed me as a credible witness, as noted above. Despite neither Bigham nor SMARCA being a respondent in this case, and while it does not appear they have a vested interest in the outcome, Bigham, by his demeanor, clearly favored Respondent, which called him as a witness. Bigham's answers to Respondent counsel's questions were forthright and unhesitant. His answers to counsels for the General Counsel's questions tended to be hesitant, and were occasionally non-responsive, unconvincing, or shifting. For example, Bigham changed his testimony a number of times as to whether Danley used the word "individually" (as in bargain individually) when he made the "Wisconsin" comment, finally settling on the answer that Danley did use the word.

According to Bigham, the purpose of these conversations was to agree to a date for the resumption of contract negotiations following the cancellation of the June 6 meeting, and to discuss Bigham's perception that there were significant differences as to contractual priorities among the Association members, which could cause bargaining to fail.<sup>4</sup> For example, Bigham told Schwickert that the parties (the contractors) had differing opinions on issues and that Winona wasn't going to sit tight with some of the things Respondents wanted and that it was "pretty clear" that if "we were going to have an agreement we'd have to work apart." Bigham told Schwickert that a subcontractor clause, a major issue to Respondents, was not a concern for Winona, but that a "helper" job classification, which was unimportant to Respondents, was a major issue for Winona.

Despite Bigham's expressed pessimism however, Bigham and Schwickert reached no decisions as to the future course of negotiations with the Union during their conversation.<sup>5</sup> However, on June 11, Schwickert sent a letter to Bigham giving "formal notice" that Respondents were withdrawing from the multiemployer bargaining with the Union. The letter stated that Respondents were accepting the Union's "offer" to negotiate separately because "after considering the current status of negotiations we see and feel there are irreconcilable differences on several items including the subcontracting language."

On June 12, at about 1:30 p.m., Respondents faxed identical letters to Danley, dated June 11 and signed by Schwickert. The letters stated:

Based upon the clear divisions of the parties and your statement that you will not ever agree to a change in the subcontract clause, we have now decided to accept the offer or proposal you made at one of our negotiation sessions. That is, we will now bargain with you individually and not as part of any multi-employer group, including SMARCA. Accordingly, this is a formal notice that we are withdrawing from the multiemployer group and will bargain with Local 96 on an individual basis.

The letters went on to state that Respondents would not meet with the Union as scheduled on June 13. While the fax stamp on the letters indicated that the letters were faxed the afternoon of June 12 to the Union, Danley testified, without contradiction, that he was not in his office that day and, hence, did not see the letters on June 12.

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<sup>4</sup> Respondent's brief, citing certain transcript pages, asserts that in his individual conversations with the contractor-members Bigham discussed "Danley's offer to bargain with each contractor individually." While there is evidence that Bigham spoke to the contractors concerning his pessimism about reaching an agreement because of differences between the contractors, the record does not support the assertion that Bigham specifically discussed Danley's "Wisconsin" comment or any offer to bargain individually.

<sup>5</sup> Schwickert's memory appeared hazy as to how many conversations he had with Bigham during the June 6-11 period, as is reflected in the following testimony:

The Witness (Schwickert): "I don't recall a second one but I know there was more than one."

Judge Rubin: "You don't recall a second one but you know there is more than one. Is that your answer?"

The Witness: "Best one I got right now."

Also on June 12, at about 2:15 p.m., Bigham faxed a letter to Danley at the Union's office, blaming Danley for the Union's failure to move on several issues important to some of the contractor-members, and stating, "This has caused us to consider your offer that the contractors negotiate separately and they have now decided to dissolve their bargaining group and to negotiate separately.<sup>6</sup> Each company will now negotiate separately. They will also, unless they decide otherwise, continue to use SMARCA services in future negotiations." The letter added, "For the meeting of June 13, those who attended are also willing to meet jointly with you but only under the understanding and agreement that they can withdraw from those joint negotiations at any time." Again, Danley did not see this letter on June 12 as he was not in his office.

The scheduled bargaining session was held on June 13, with Danley and Stinson attending for the Union, Bigham and Quarnstrom for SMARCA, Kiker for Kiker, and Plachecki for Winona. Neither Schwickert nor any other representative for Respondents attended. As the meeting began, Bigham asked Danley if he had seen a letter from Respondents. When Danley stated he had not, Bigham handed Danley a copy of Respondent's June 11 letter, and Bigham's June 12 letter. Danley reviewed the letters, commented to the effect that Respondents had assigned their bargaining rights to SMARCA, and said "let's go."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On cross-examination, after Bigham testified that it was his view that the contractors had no bargaining obligation to the Union following expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, Bigham denied that this was part of the reason the contractors decided to dissolve the multiemployer bargaining group. After being shown his prior affidavit, where such was indicated, Bigham changed his testimony and admitted that, in fact, the lack of a 9(a) relationship was part, but not the entire, reason for the decision to dissolve the employer bargaining group.

<sup>7</sup> Bigham testified that he specifically asked Danley whether he understood the letter or letters, that Danley said he did, that Bigham asked Danley if he was willing to proceed on that basis, and that Danley replied, "Let's proceed." Quarnstrom, who reports to Bigham, testified that Bigham merely asked Danley if he understood the letter, and did not testify that Bigham asked Danley if he was willing to proceed on the basis of the letter. I also note that, on cross-examination, Bigham admitted that in a sworn affidavit earlier provided to the NLRB during the investigation he stated that after Danley read the letter the Union continued to negotiate "thus accepting our conditions," but did not state that Danley verbally agreed to Bigham's conditions for continued negotiations. When asked about this seeming inconsistency, Bigham denied it was inconsistent and testified as to his affidavit, "I didn't say there wasn't anything else [to demonstrate Danley's alleged acceptance of Bigham's conditions for bargaining]." I find this answer to be somewhat facile, and one more indication of a witness more interested in helping one side win a case, than in forthrightly answering the questions of counsel. Thus, I conclude, that the truth was set forth in Danley's testimony, and that Bigham's affidavit, to the effect that in Bigham's view Danley agreed to Bigham's conditions by his actions in continuing to bargain, is accurate, as opposed to Bigham's trial testimony to the effect that Danley verbally assented to Bigham's conditions. It defies common sense that if Danley had, in fact, verbally agreed to Bigham's conditions, that Bigham, an attorney and an experienced labor relations professional, would have neglected to set forth that significant detail in his affidavit. Finally, I note that Respondents' brief inaccurately asserts that Quarnstrom agreed with Bigham's testimony to the effect that Bigham specifically asked Danley if he understood that the contractors would only bargain on an individual basis, and that Danley "said he understood and he agreed to negotiate." In fact, as noted above, Quarnstrom explicitly testified: "Jim Bigham stated to [Danley], 'You understand what that letter means?', and Mr. Danley said, 'Yes. Let's go.'" Understanding the meaning of a letter is not the same thing as agreeing to what is set forth in

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The Union, SMARCA (by Bigham and Quarnstrom), and the contractors other than Respondents then continued negotiations on June 13, taking up and working from the same proposals they had previously been utilizing in negotiations. During the bargaining session, the Union made a concession in its proposal. After the employer representatives caucused, Bigham told Danley that the Union had made a significant concession, but that the employer side was going to stop negotiations for the day. Danley asked that they continue negotiating, but Bigham responded that he was not sure what the Respondents were going to be doing; that he thought they were exploring all of their options. Bigham encouraged Danley to meet with Schwickert. Danley did, in fact, call Schwickert about June 15 or 16, and left a voicemail message asking Schwickert to call him so they could arrange a meeting to discuss Schwickert's June 12 letter.

On June 18, Respondents sent two identical letters to Danley, both signed by Schwickert, stating that "We have decided to repudiate the collective-bargaining agreement between [Respondents] and Roofers Local 96. We repudiate these two agreements effective at the close of business today, June 18, 2003." While the contract Schwickert referred to in the letters expired May 31, Schwickert testified that it was his intent and understanding that by sending the letters to the Union he was ending the bargaining relationship between Respondents and the Union.<sup>8</sup> When asked at trial why he decided to send the letter, Schwickert responded, "We reviewed the relationship with the Union which had taken place for many years and concluded that the Union and our company had different goals in mind."

Respondents then, on June 19, convened a meeting of all their employees to discuss their abrogation of the collective-bargaining relationship with the Union. Schwickert told the assembled employees that the Respondents had repudiated their relationships with the Union, that employees could continue to work for Respondents and be union members, but that the Union could fine members who worked for nonunion employers, and that those employees would be solely responsible for such fines. Schwickert informed the employees that Respondents had implemented new fringe benefits and wage rates. Respondents' safety/HR director, Mark Viola, testified that he told the employees of the new benefit programs including health and dental insurance, holiday and vacation pay, and sick leave, and paperwork was distributed to the employees detailing the new wage rates and benefits, which were different from those set forth in the expired collective-bargaining agreement. Respondents also made available at the meeting union resignation forms prepared, typed, and photocopied by Respondents. Schwickert described to the assembled employees the union resignation forms, which were placed at the back of the room along with other forms.<sup>9</sup> Subsequent to the meeting, Respondents provided stamped envelopes to each employee in their timecard slots, and advised the employees "that the envelopes could be used to mail the resignation forms to the Union, if they chose to do so, and that the envelopes should be addressed in the employee's own handwriting."<sup>10</sup>

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the letter.

<sup>8</sup> In Respondents' brief, it is conceded that the intent of the June 18 letter was to repudiate Respondents' individual relationships with the Union.

<sup>9</sup> While there was also testimony from some witnesses that the forms were distributed to employees at the meeting, I credit the witnesses who testified that the forms were placed at the rear of the meeting room, and accessible to all the employees present. The testimony of these witnesses was consistent, and makes sense in the credited overall context of the meeting.

<sup>10</sup> The parties, in essence, stipulated to such.

Within a month of Respondents' June 19 employee meeting, five bargaining unit employees of Respondents had resigned their employment. Schwickert employees Ben Pugh, Ryan Augustine, and Jerome Mundt, and Schwickert's Rochester employees Raymond Oman and Brad Musel, all of whom attended the June 19 meeting, tendered their resignations and took jobs with various contractors who maintained collective-bargaining relationships with the Union. All left because of Respondents' unilateral changes in their union-negotiated terms and conditions of employment, and their desire to continue to work for an employer that maintained a bargaining relationship with the Union,<sup>11</sup> and all left Respondents for such employment.

On July 8, in response to Bigham's June 12 letter, Danley wrote to Bigham, maintaining that the contractors' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining "well after negotiations were underway," constituted an unfair labor practice. Danley characterized his own bargaining table comments as to the apparent differences among the contractors as merely "frustration," and not as a serious offer to negotiate separately with each contractor. On July 9, Bigham wrote to Danley, asserting that Danley did offer to bargain individually with the contractors, and pointed to Danley's "Wisconsin" comment. In the letter, Bigham also accused Danley of bad faith by making a comment at one of the bargaining sessions to the effect that the Union would never agree to SMARCA's subcontracting proposal. On July 11, Danley wrote to Bigham, denying his own bad faith, and expressing hope that Bigham had "changed [his] approach and now [did] have a desire to negotiate in good faith." Danley proposed several dates for the resumption of negotiations. Bigham responded to Danley with a letter dated July 15, in which he informed Danley that Winona and Kiker desired to resume negotiations, "both on an individual basis and not as part of any multiemployer bargaining group." On July 21, the Union filed 8(a)(5) charges against both Schwickert's Rochester and Schwickert, alleging that the Respondents unlawfully and untimely withdrew from multiemployer bargaining.

Another bargaining session took place on July 22, attended by Danley and Stinson for the Union, Bigham and Quarnstrom for SMARCA, Kiker for Kiker, and Plachecki for Winona. Thus, except for the Respondents, the same parties and individuals who had been present during the multiemployer bargaining, were present for the resumed negotiations. Bigham testified that SMARCA's role at the meeting was to represent Winona and Kiker, individually. Neither the Union, the contractors, nor SMARCA made new proposals at this meeting, but instead worked from previous proposals and tentative agreements from the meetings of May 14, 21, and 29, and June 13. Neither side changed items previously tentatively agreed to, nor resurrected proposals that had been previously rejected. Tentative agreement was reached at this meeting, and the union membership voted approval at a ratification vote on July 29. However, as found below, no contract between the Union and SMARCA, or the Association, or any of the contractors involved in this case, has been signed to date.

Almost 3 months later, on October 8, Stinson met with Bigham, and presented him with a written version of the July 22 agreement. Bigham reviewed the written agreement, and then told Stinson that the title page "had the Association language on it and that this language needed to be removed because the parties had negotiated separately." Bigham testified that Stinson replied that "he knew that we were bargaining that way but that the reference to the multiemployer unit should remain because the parties agreed to the same contract terms for

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<sup>11</sup> Pugh's testimony, on cross-examination, indicated that he also was unhappy with his supervisor, but that his primary motive for his resigning was Respondents' repudiation of its collective-bargaining relationship with the Union. I credit that testimony as Pugh's testimonial demeanor and responsiveness to questions from both sides was impressive, and while Pugh may have been unhappy with his supervision, he didn't resign until after the June 19 meeting.



Winona and Kiker.” On cross-examination, Bigham admitted that in a letter dated October 17 sent to Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board, in which he describes in some detail this meeting with Stinson, there is no mention of this comment, which Bigham alleges Stinson made. Stinson did not testify.<sup>12</sup>

Thereafter, about December 5, Bigham sent a letter to Danley stating that, “To the extent the bargaining relationship still exists, the [Association] hereby repudiate[s] the Section 8(f) collective-bargaining agreement and bargaining relationship with [the Union] on behalf of itself and the individual contractors it represents. Additionally, please be advised that we have terminated and dissolved the multiemployer bargaining group.” In response, the Union filed additional charges against Kiker and Winona, alleging that they had unlawfully withdrawn from multiemployer bargaining.<sup>13</sup>

On January 26, 2004, Bigham and Quarnstrom of SMARCA, Kiker, and Plachecki met with Danley. Danley distributed to the other participants written copies of the unsigned July 22 agreement, prepared by the Union. The parties discussed the contractual language the parties had agreed to in July, and Bigham’s objections to the Union draft that he had written to Danley about in October. Bigham testified that at this meeting Danley acknowledged that there were separate agreements for Kiker and Winona, but Bigham further testified that the terms of the Kiker and Winona agreements were identical. Subsequent to this meeting, Danley sent Bigham new written agreements prepared by the Union, changed to reflect Bigham’s complaints raised at the January 26, 2004 meeting. Despite these changes, including a change to the cover page to reflect one contract for Winona and one for Kiker, Bigham still refused to sign the agreement because the signature pages still referenced the Association and SMARCA language contained in the agreement since the original draft prepared by the Union and presented to Bigham in October. Bigham has since insisted that the Union remove the references to the Association and SMARCA, but the Union has not agreed. The agreements remain unsigned.

### Analysis and Conclusions

#### Respondents’ Withdrawal From Multiemployer Bargaining

All of the substantive complaint allegations here flow from the Respondents’ decision to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining. As Respondents maintain in their brief, and counsels for the General Counsel do not disagree, if Respondents lawfully withdrew from multiemployer bargaining, all of the substantive complaint allegations fall, as Respondents, being 8(f) employers, would have otherwise acted within their rights to both withdraw recognition and unilaterally set new terms and conditions of employment for their employees, following expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement. Where the parties differ, of course, is that counsels for the General Counsel assert that Respondents’ withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was untimely and without the assent of the Union and, hence, illegal, while Respondents maintain that the withdrawal was either at the suggestion of the Union, or with its consent, either actual or implied.

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<sup>12</sup> Again, and for the reasons set forth above, I decline to credit Bigham’s account of Stinson’s alleged comment. As noted earlier, if, in fact, Stinson had made the comment, it defies logic that Bigham, an attorney well versed in labor relations, would have failed to include such detail in his letter to the Region in which he details the conversation. While it is true that Stinson did not testify, I also note that counsels for the General Counsel objected to the relevance of this entire line of testimony.

<sup>13</sup> These charges were eventually withdrawn pursuant to a non-Board settlement.

The basic guidelines as to withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining units were explicated by the Board, as follows, in *Retail Associates, Inc.*, 120 NLRB 388, 395 (1958):

5           We would accordingly refuse to permit the withdrawal of an  
 employer or a union from a duly established multiemployer bargaining  
 unit, except upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by  
 the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the  
 10       multiemployer negotiations. Where actual negotiations based on the  
 existing multiemployer unit have begun, we would not permit, except on  
 mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which each side has  
 committed itself to the other, absent unusual circumstances.

15       The Board's rules attempt to accommodate both the fundamental purpose of the Act of  
 maintaining stability in multiemployer bargaining relationships, once lawfully established,  
 and of allowing the parties their requisite freedom to withdraw their consent at suitable  
 periods. *Southwestern Colorado Contractors Assn.*, 153 NLRB 1141 (1965), enfd. 379  
 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1967).

20           The Board, in *John Deklewa & Sons*, 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enfd. *Iron Workers Local 3*  
*v. NLRB*, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied *Deklewa v. NLRB*, 488 U.S. 889 (1988), set  
 different rules to govern the sanctity of collective-bargaining agreements and relationships when  
 recognition was granted to the union under Section 8 (f) of the Act, as opposed to Section 9(a).  
 25       In *James Luterbach Construction Co.*, 315 NLRB 976, 979-980 (1994), the Board applied its  
*Retail Associates* rule to 8(f) employers as follows:

30           In the 8(f) context, we conclude that in order for an employer to  
 obligate itself to be bound by multiemployer bargaining, there must be  
 more than inaction, i.e., the absence of a timely withdrawal. Thus, unlike  
 in *Retail Associates*, supra, mere inaction during multiemployer  
 negotiations will not bind an 8(f) employer to a successor contract  
 reached through those multiemployer negotiations. Rather, the following  
 two part test will be used to decide whether an 8(f) employer has  
 35       obligated itself to be bound by the results of the multiemployer bargaining.  
 First, we will examine whether the employer was part of the  
 multiemployer unit prior to the dispute giving rise to the case. If this first  
 inquiry is answered affirmatively, then we will examine whether that  
 employer has, by a distinct affirmative action, recommitted to the union  
 40       that it will be bound by the upcoming or current multiemployer  
 negotiations.

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45       [A]n 8(f) employer that engages in a distinct affirmative act that would  
 reasonably lead the union to believe that the employer intended to be  
 bound by the upcoming or current negotiations will be deemed to have  
 agreed to be bound by the results of that bargaining. Ultimately, that  
 employer—meeting both parts of our test—will be deemed to have clearly  
 50       and unmistakably waived both its right to withdraw recognition on contract  
 expiration from the union and its right to bargain as an individual.

However, even when an employer withdraws from multiemployer bargaining on an untimely basis, such withdrawal is lawful if the union consents to such withdrawal, or implies assent or acquiescence through a course of affirmative action which is clearly antithetical to the union's claims that the employer has not withdrawn from multiemployer bargaining. *Preston H. Haskell Co.*, 238 NLRB 943, 948 (1978). The Board considers the totality of the union's conduct towards the withdrawing employer to determine whether the union has acquiesced in the employer's withdrawal. *CTS, Inc.*, 340 NLRB No. 99, slip op. at 5 (2003).<sup>14</sup> "In determining whether the union has consented or acquiesced to the employer's withdrawal, a prime indicator is the union's willingness to engage in individual bargaining with the employer that is seeking to abandon multiemployer bargaining." *Id.*

The union's failure to immediately object to an employer's attempted withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining is not considered an implied consent to the putative withdrawal, *Haskell*, *supra* at 948. However, acquiescence does exist where a union engages in separate negotiations with a withdrawing employer, listens to counterproposals, and agrees to make certain concessions not offered the multiemployer association. *I. C. Refrigeration Service*, 200 NLRB 687, 690 (1972), *Hartz-Kirkpatrick Construction Co.*, 195 NLRB 863 (1972). For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was both untimely and unlawful, and that the Union neither agreed to, nor acquiesced, in that withdrawal.

There is little dispute that Respondents obligated themselves to multiemployer bargaining under the two-step test set forth by the Board in *Lutrbach*, *supra*. First, for many years, Respondents were party to multiemployer bargaining and were, hence, part of the multiemployer unit prior to the dispute giving rise to this case. Second, Respondents, prior to the start of the latest round of multiemployer negotiations, designated SMARCA, in writing, as their representative for such negotiations, and then actively engaged in at least three multiemployer negotiating meetings with the Union, and two bargaining strategy sessions with SMARCA and the other contractor members of the Association. Thus, Respondents have engaged in distinct affirmative actions, which recommitted to the Union that it would be bound by the multiemployer negotiations.

Since, under the *Lutrbach* test, Respondents recommitted to multiemployer bargaining and, thus, cannot withdraw once negotiations have begun,<sup>15</sup> Respondents

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<sup>14</sup> That the Union's conduct to be measured is vis-à-vis the withdrawing employer is explicitly set forth in the cited case, and numerous other Board decisions. Yet, Respondents, in their brief, cite the Board decision in *Associated Shower Door Co.*, 205 NLRB 677, 681 (1973), for the proposition that "a union's consent may be predicated on its conduct addressed to an employer other than the withdrawing employer." Neither that Board decision, nor the administrative law judge decision on the cited page, sets forth such a rule, nor stands for the proposition asserted by Respondent. Indeed, in the concurring opinion, Chairman Miller, agreeing with the majority's finding of an unfair labor practice, disagreed with the majority as follows: "The [administrative law judge], however, viewed the law as being that union acquiescence to employer withdrawal must be based on interaction between the union and the particular withdrawing employer. I would not adopt this view."

<sup>15</sup> Except under unusual circumstances. See *Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service*, 243 NLRB 1093 (1979), enf. 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980). During the trial, Respondent's counsel explicitly

are bound to the multiemployer negotiations and any resulting agreement, unless the Union agreed or acquiesced to Respondents' untimely withdrawal. Respondents maintain that the Union agreed or acquiesced, arguing that it was the Union that proposed individual bargaining, that the Union did not object to Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining, and that the Union acquiesced in Respondents' withdrawal by its actions in bargaining with Kiker and Winona subsequent to Respondents' withdrawal. I conclude to the contrary.

Respondents argue that Danley's "Wisconsin" comment was, in effect, a proposal to bargain individually. Contrariwise, I conclude that Danley's offhand comment was sarcastic or rhetorical, made in the midst of a difficult day of bargaining, and borne out of the bargaining table frustration of a day spent with little or no progress towards an agreement. Neither the credited context within which Danley made the comment, nor Bigham's sarcastic answer, "Oh yeah Bob, that really works well in Wisconsin," indicates that the comment was anything other than an expression of frustration, and taken as such by SMARCA's representative, Bigham.<sup>16</sup>

In any case, bargaining continued for a considerable period of time subsequent to the comment, and resulted in an offer which Danley took back to the membership for a vote. There was not then, nor at any time thereafter, a serious discussion among the parties concerning individual bargaining. There was only the sarcastic initial response of Bigham, Schwickert's comment as to the employers being a "team," and Danley's agreement with Bigham's comment that individual bargaining would not be good for the industry. Based on such, I cannot conclude that there was a serious offer from the Union to bargain individually, nor that the Association, SMARCA, or the individual contractors took Danley's "Wisconsin" comment to be anything other than rhetorical, designed to convey to the other parties the level of frustration Danley was experiencing.

I further conclude that the Union's course of conduct subsequent to Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining did not demonstrate agreement with, or acquiescence in, Respondents' withdrawal. As noted above, if union consent to withdrawal is to be implied, its conduct must involve a course of affirmative action which is clearly antithetical to its claims that the employer has not withdrawn from multiemployer bargaining. "Neither the Union's failure to immediately object to

conceded that there were no unusual circumstances in this case ("I'm not arguing that there are unusual circumstances."), but then attempted to resurrect this argument in his brief, asserting that the Union's negotiations with Kiker and Winona created unusual circumstances. I reject this belated argument. The Board has held that after negotiations have begun, the "unusual circumstance" exception is limited to "cases in which 'the very existence of an employer as a viable business entity has ceased or is about to cease' and to cases where consensual employer withdrawal through separate bargaining have so depleted a unit that it would be 'unfair and harmful to the collective-bargaining process' not to permit one or more of the remaining employers to withdraw." *Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service*, supra at 1093. Neither situation applies here. There is no evidence that the existence of Respondents is threatened, and Respondents can hardly argue that their own withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining has so depleted the unit, that they should be forgiven this alleged transgression.

<sup>16</sup> Likewise, for example, an employer representative's bargaining table comment in response to a union demand for a wage increase, to the effect of "maybe we should just give you the keys to the plant," is not a serious proposal that the union assume ownership of the plant in lieu of a wage increase.

Respondent's withdrawal nor its failure immediately to demand Respondent's signature on the contract is considered an implied consent to the putative withdrawal." *Reliable Roofing Co.*, 246 NLRB 716 (1979). However, acquiescence does exist where a union engages in separate negotiations with a withdrawing employer, listens to counterproposals, and agrees to make certain concessions not offered the association. *I.C. Refrigeration*, supra at 690, citing *Hartz-Kirkpatrick Construction Co.*, supra.

Respondents argue that the Union's course of affirmative conduct here includes Danley's attempt to telephone Schwickert, and the resultant voice mail message left for Schwickert about June 15, Danley's conversation with Bigham and subsequent bargaining with SMARCA, Winona, and Kiker on June 13, and subsequent contract negotiating meetings with SMARCA, Winona, and Kiker. I conclude, however, that these occurrences do not amount to a course of affirmative action clearly antithetical to the Union's position, particularly where, as here, the Union, instead of agreeing to Respondents' withdrawal, sent a letter to SMARCA on July 8 protesting Respondents' withdrawal, and then filed 8(a)(5) charges against Respondents on July 21, alleging untimely and illegal withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. The filing of unfair labor practice charges here, based on Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining, is as definitive a demand to return to multiemployer bargaining as any that could be uttered verbally. See *Preston H. Haskell Co.*, supra at 943.

While it is true that the Union continued to bargain with SMARCA, Kiker, and Winona without the presence or participation of Respondents, the Union had little choice after Respondents communicated their untimely withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining and then renounced their relationship with the Union. In short, the Union had no alternative if it was going to represent its membership than to continue to bargain with the remaining members of the multiemployer group and SMARCA. While I concluded, above, that Danley did not explicitly tell Bigham on June 13 that he was willing to proceed on the basis of bargaining with individual employers, even if he had, or even if a union representative at some later date communicated such to SMARCA, it would make no difference because the Union had no choice as a result of Respondents' unfair labor practices. Unlike the Board's decision in *Hi-Way Billboards*, 206 NLRB 22 (1973), cited in Respondents' brief (and by the Supreme Court in *Charles D. Bonano Linen Service v. NLRB*, 454 U.S. 404, 412-415 (1982)), where the union struck the multiemployer group, and then negotiated a contract with one group of employers and continued the strike against other employers thereby creating a whipsaw effect, here the Union was simply continuing to bargain with the contractors who remained after Respondents exited the multiemployer bargaining.

Further, all of these actions of the Union here were in relation to SMARCA and to the contractors other than Respondents. As found above, after Respondents exited multiemployer bargaining, negotiations resumed with the parties taking up and working from the same proposals and tentative agreements that were on the table prior to Respondents' withdrawal, and when those parties reached tentative agreement on July 22 none of the parties changed items previously tentatively agreed to, nor resurrected proposals that had been previously rejected.

The Board has repeatedly held, most recently in *CTS, Inc.*, supra, that the union's course of conduct to be considered is vis-à-vis the withdrawing employer, and that a prime indicator of acquiescence is the union's willingness to engage in individual

bargaining with such employer. Here, there is no evidence demonstrating that the Union was willing to engage in individual bargaining with Respondents,<sup>17</sup> and Respondents' arguments as to the Union's course of conduct are centered on the Union's course of continued bargaining with Kiker, Winona, and SMARCA, not with the Respondents.

5 There is also no evidence that the Union expressed a willingness to the Respondents, or even to Kiker or Winona, to discuss terms peculiar to an individual employer's operations and listen to such counterproposals, a further indication that the Union did not acquiesce in Respondents' withdrawal. See *I.C. Refrigeration Service*, supra at 690.

10 Finally, citing *James Luterbach Construction Co.*, supra at fn. 9 ("absent agreement to the contrary, the employer association may exercise the rights granted employers under *Deklewa* and withdraw recognition from the union on expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement"), Respondents argue that SMARCA's belated letter of December 5 to the Union, repudiating the collective-bargaining agreement and  
15 bargaining relationship with the Union on behalf of the Association and its individual contractors, and dissolving the multiemployer bargaining group, served to end whatever bargaining obligation remained, and to ameliorate any earlier unfair labor practices.

20 The Board has held, however, that in the absence of union agreement, untimely dissolution of the multiemployer bargaining group is tantamount to an unlawful withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. See *NLRB v. Southwestern Colorado Contractors Assn.*, 379 F.2d 360, 363-364 (10th Cir. 1967), enforcing *Southwestern Colorado Contractors Assn.*, 153 NLRB 1141 (1965), where the Court held, "The Board thus concluded that dissolution of the Association was tantamount to attempted  
25 withdrawal from a multiemployer unit at an inappropriate time." I conclude, thus, that the dissolution of the Association on December 5 does not negate Respondents' unfair labor practices.

30 This is true regardless of whether the alleged dissolution occurred in December, or in June, as Respondents argue in the alternative. In either case, dissolution would have occurred after the start of multiemployer bargaining, without the agreement or acquiescence of the Union, and over the explicit objection of the Union. Even if dissolution of the Association had been accomplished on a timely basis, its mere dissolution would not preclude the obligation of all of its members to engage in

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17 Respondents' assertion, in its brief, that in a voicemail message about June 15 or 16, Danley "asked Schwickert to call him so they could arrange a time to meet regarding new agreements" is without any foundation in the record. The brief cites record testimony of Schwickert as to the voicemail as follows: "Mr. Danley said that he received my letter and  
40 wanted to arrange a meeting." "He was referring to my June 12th letter indicating we were going to negotiate separately." Respondents' brief also cites record pages containing Danley's testimony as to the voicemail: "I believe I just told him 'Kent, this is Bob. Give me a call. I want to discuss your letter.'" In short, the cited testimony indicates that in his voicemail message, Danley simply asked Schwickert to return his call so they could discuss Schwickert's letter in  
45 which Respondents withdrew from multiemployer bargaining. The testimony of Schwickert and Danley cited by Respondents contains nothing of meeting "regarding new agreements." Union contact with a withdrawing employer for the purpose of attempting to secure its return to multiemployer bargaining is not evidence demonstrative of acquiescence. See *I.C. Refrigeration Service*, supra at 690. There is no evidence that the Union, either by this phone  
50 message, or by any other actions or words, indicated it was interested in bargaining a separate contract with Respondents.

multiemployer bargaining with or without the existence of the Association. See *Southwestern Colorado Contractors Assn.*, supra at 1143, where the Board held, “In remedying the violation found, we deem it unnecessary to direct the reconstitution of the Association since the existence of a formal association is not a prerequisite to the establishment or continuance of a multiemployer bargaining unit.”

Of course the December 5 letter<sup>18</sup> seeks more than the dissolution of the Association. It also purports, on behalf of the Association and the individual contractors, to dissolve the 8(f) bargaining relationship with the Union. And, as Respondents argue, it appears that unless otherwise precluded, even where an individual employer could not withdraw recognition pursuant to Section 8(f), the group, as a whole, could do such. See *Lutrbach*, supra at fn. 9.

Here, however, it was Respondents’ unremedied unfair labor practices which initiated a chain of events which culminated in the December 5 letter. In view of the history of successful collective bargaining between the Union and the multiemployer group over many years, It appears unlikely that such a letter would have been sent, absent the unfair labor practices.

Further, even if the December 5 letter served to put an end to the continuing unfair labor practices of Respondent in refusing to participate in multiemployer bargaining, it would not negate the commission of those unfair labor practices. In these circumstances, the only effective remedy would be to return the parties to where they were had no unfair labor practices been committed or, in other words, the status quo ante. As the Board held in *Porta-King Building Systems*, 310 NLRB 539 (1993), citing *Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.*, 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1975), “Our task in applying Section 10(c) is ‘to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no unfair labor practices.’”

As to bargaining, the status quo ante here is a return by the Respondents to multiemployer bargaining, with or without a formal employer association. See *Southwestern Colorado Contractors Assn.*, supra at 1143. This result is consistent with the courts’ and Board’s oft-expressed view of the important role multiemployer bargaining occupies in the labor relations arena, and of the necessity of stability to the success of multiemployer bargaining. As set forth by the Supreme Court, “by permitting the union and employers to concentrate their bargaining resources on the negotiation of a single contract, multiemployer bargaining enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the collective-bargaining process and there by reduces industrial strife. For these reasons, Congress has recognized multiemployer bargaining as a ‘vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining.’” *NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449*, 353 U.S. 87 at 95 (1957).

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<sup>18</sup> I also note that despite the wording of the December 5 letter, ending the 8(f) bargaining relationships between the contractors and the Union, essentially nothing changed. Thus, SMARCA, Kiker, and Winona continued to bargain with the Union, reaching agreement on all terms, except whether SMARCA would be included in the wording. Respondents continued not to participate in this bargaining. Thus, it appears that the only purpose of the letter was to attempt to negate Respondents’ earlier, unremedied, unfair labor practices.

Here, it appears that Respondents became unhappy during contract negotiations with the Union over the Union's failure to move on subcontracting, an issue of significance to Respondents. Indeed, Schwickert's letter of June 11 to the Union cites the subcontracting issue as a basis for Respondents' withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. But, a party's unhappiness with the course of bargaining or with the bargaining proposals of the other side does not validate an otherwise untimely withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. Indeed, the Board's rules as to multiemployer bargaining are designed to assure a certain degree of stability, and to avoid the breakup of such bargaining just because the parties differ as to a particular bargaining issue or issues, or because of other ephemeral difficulties in bargaining.

#### Respondents' Postwithdrawal Unilateral Changes

Because I have found under the two-step *Lutrbach* test that Respondents obligated themselves to be bound by multiemployer bargaining, I further conclude that Respondents could not on June 18 unilaterally discontinue their 8(f) relationship with the Union and, thus, could not on June 19 unilaterally change wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.<sup>19</sup> As the Board said in *Lutrbach*, supra at 980, an employer that meets both parts of the test, "will be deemed to have clearly and unmistakably waived both its right to withdraw recognition on contract expiration from the union, and its right to bargain as an individual." Here, there is no dispute that Respondents, on June 19, unilaterally changed their employees' terms and conditions of employment, as described above. Those actions violate Section 8(a)(5).

#### Respondents' Actions at the June 19 Employee Meeting

Again, these 8(a)(1) allegations are dependent upon the 8(a)(5) outcome. Inasmuch as I have concluded that Respondents were bound to multiemployer bargaining, and could not, on June 18, unilaterally discontinue their bargaining relationships with the Union, I further conclude that Respondents could not tell employees that they would no longer enjoy union representation, that Respondents had repudiated their relationships with the Union and would no longer deal with the Union as the employees' representative, that the Union could fine employees who continued to work for Respondents, and that Respondents would discontinue union benefit programs.

Counsels for the General Counsel assert that Respondents' actions in preparing and placing union resignation forms at the back of the meeting room and, further, distributing stamped envelopes to employees and advising them that the purpose of the envelopes was to mail the resignations to the Union, interfered with and restrained Respondents' employees. Respondents' brief does not discuss this specific allegation, but argues that all of the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations should be dismissed because the 8(a)(5) allegations are nonmeritorious. I conclude, that in the context of the other 8(a)(1) violations committed at the June 19 meeting, and the unsolicited discussion of possible Union fines, the employees would tend to feel peril in refraining from utilizing the forms, and that, thus, Respondents' conduct violated Section 8(a)(1). See *Mueller Energy Services*, 333 NLRB 262 (2001).

<sup>19</sup> Respondents' brief, citing *Wehr Constructors, Inc.*, 159 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1998), correctly posits that if Respondents were not bound to multiemployer bargaining they would be free to unilaterally set new terms and conditions of employment upon expiration of the 8(f) collective-bargaining agreement. Of course, I have found Respondents so bound.



## Constructive Discharges

Counsels for the General Counsel maintain that former employees of Respondents, Ben Pugh, Ryan Augustine, Jerome Mundt, Raymond Oman, and Brad Musel, all of whom resigned within about a month of the June 19 meeting, were, in effect, constructively discharged by Respondents. Respondents, in their brief, simply argue that “this theory is dependent on a finding that the employers unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union [and] General Counsel cannot prove that the employers unlawfully withdrew recognition.” In support of their position, counsels for the General Counsel cite the Board’s decisions in *Control Services*, 303 NLRB 481 (1991), and *Excel Fire Protection Co.*, 308 NLRB 241, 248 (1992).

The Board, in *Control Services*, in finding an unfair labor practice, reasoned as follows: “we rely on the theory of constructive discharge applicable to employees who quit after being confronted with a choice between resignation or continued employment conditioned on relinquishment of statutory rights.” *Id.* at 485. With the exception of Pugh,<sup>20</sup> Respondents do not seriously argue that the five named alleged discriminatees resigned for any reason other than Respondents’ actions of June 18 and 19, in renouncing their bargaining relationship with the Union and unilaterally imposing new terms and conditions of employment. As I have found, above, that all five former employees resigned because of Respondents’ actions vis-à-vis their representation by the Union and because of Respondents’ unilateral changes, I conclude that they were, in fact, constructively discharged by Respondents, and entitled to reinstatement. See *Electric Machinery Co.*, 243 NLRB 239 at 240 (1979).

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondents and the Association are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. At all material times, the Union has been, and is now, pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following appropriate bargaining unit of Respondents’ employees:

All full and regular part time journeymen and apprentice employees employed as roofers, and damp and waterproofing workers by Respondents, excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees.

4. Since June 11, 2003, Respondents have failed and refused to recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of their employees within the unit described above in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by: about June 11, withdrawing from multiemployer bargaining; about June 19, withdrawing recognition from the Union and, thereafter, refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union; and about June 19, unilaterally implementing new terms and conditions of employment.

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<sup>20</sup> As to former employee Ben Pugh, Respondents assert that whether Pugh resigned because of the union representation issue is “speculative.” As I found, above, in crediting his testimony, Pugh did, in fact, resign because he did not want to work without the benefit of representation by the Union.

5. Respondents constructively discharged the following employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, about the dates set forth after their names: Ray Oman (end of June 2003), Brad Musel (end of June 2003), Jerry Mundt (mid-July 2003), Ryan Augustine (mid-July 2003), and Ben Pugh (July 26, 2003).

6. About June 19, 2003, Respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1), by engaging in the following acts and conduct: informing employees that they would no longer be represented by the Union; and distributing pre-stamped envelopes to employees to be used to mail resignation forms to the Union, such forms having been made available by Respondents to their employees.

7. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondents affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended<sup>21</sup>

### ORDER

The Respondents, Schwickert's of Rochester, Inc., Rochester, Minnesota, and Schwickert, Inc., of Mankato, Minnesota, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

#### 1. Cease and desist from

(a) Constructively discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because they engage in union activities or to discourage employees from engaging in such activities.

(b) Withdrawing or withholding recognition from the Union, unilaterally changing, or imposing new, terms and conditions of employment on their employees, refusing to participate in multiemployer bargaining as to these employees with the Union, or otherwise refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of their employees within the unit set forth above.

(c) Informing employees that they are no longer represented by the Union, or providing employees with forms and stamped envelopes for the purpose of resigning from the Union, or in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

#### 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act

(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, Respondent Schwickert offer Ben Pugh, Ryan Augustine, and Jerome Mundt, and Respondent Schwickert's Rochester offer Raymond Oman and Brad Musel, full and immediate reinstatement to their former jobs or, if

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<sup>21</sup> If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Board shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.

(b) Make whole Ben Pugh, Ryan Augustine, Jerome Mundt, Raymond Oman, and Brad Musel for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, computed in the manner set forth in *F. W. Woolworth Co.*, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in *New Horizons for the Retarded*, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).

(c) Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees within the unit set forth above, bargain in good faith with the Union upon its request, as part of the multiemployer bargaining group, make their employees whole for any losses or expenses incurred as a result of the changes in wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment implemented about June 19, 2004, without bargaining with the Union, and restore the wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment in effect prior to those changes.

(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from their files any references to the constructive discharges or involuntary resignations of Ben Pugh, Ryan Augustine, Jerome Mundt, Raymond Oman, and Brad Musel and, within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this has been done and that the unlawful conduct will not be used against them in any way.

(e) Within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, preserve and provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of the Order.

(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at their facilities in Rochester and Mankato, Minnesota, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."<sup>22</sup> Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondents' authorized representatives, shall be posted by the Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondents have gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in these proceedings, Respondents shall duplicate and mail, at their own expense, copies of the notice to all employees and former employees employed by Respondents at any time since March 15, 2003.

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<sup>22</sup> If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."

(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that Respondents have taken to comply.

5           Dated, Washington, D.C.   May 25, 2004

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Mark D. Rubin  
Administrative Law Judge

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APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the  
National Labor Relations Board  
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

- Form, join, or assist a union
- Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
- Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
- Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT provide you with union resignation forms, nor with stamps or envelopes with which to mail the forms.

WE WILL NOT inform you that you will no longer be represented by the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers Local Union No. 96 (Union), at a time when we are obligated to recognize the Union as your collective-bargaining representative in the following appropriate bargaining unit:

- All full and regular part time journeymen and apprentice employees employed as roofers, and damp and waterproofing workers by us at our Rochester and Mankato, Minnesota facilities, excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees.

WE WILL NOT constructively discharge our employees by forcing them to quit and work elsewhere in order to continue to be represented by the Union, at a time when we are obligated to recognize the Union as your collective-bargaining representative.

WE WILL NOT withdraw or withhold recognition of the Union as your representative, and WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain with the Union at a time when we are obligated to recognize the Union as your collective-bargaining representative.

WE WILL NOT change any employment terms of employees in the above-described appropriate bargaining units without first notifying the Union of the proposed changes and giving it an opportunity to bargain about such changes.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union on a multiemployer basis.

WE WILL offer to Ray Oman, Brad Musel, Jerry Mundt, Ryan Augustine, and Ben Pugh their jobs back, along with all seniority and other rights and privileges.

WE WILL pay Ray Oman, Brad Musel, Jerry Mundt, Ryan Augustine, and Ben Pugh for the wages and other benefits they lost because we forced them to quit.

WE WILL remove from our records any and all references to the terminations or resignations of Ray Oman, Brad Musel, Jerry Mundt, Ryan Augustine, and Ben Pugh, and notify them in writing that this has been done.

WE WILL revoke the changes in wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment which we implemented about June 19, 2003, without first bargaining with the Union.

WE WILL make whole each bargaining unit employee for any losses or expenses incurred as a result of the changes in wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment we implemented about June 19, 2003, without first bargaining with the Union.

WE WILL recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of our employees in the unit set forth above.

WE WILL, upon request of the Union, rejoin multiemployer bargaining, and bargain with the Union on that basis.

SCHWICKERT'S OF ROCHESTER, INC. AND  
SCHWICKERT, INC.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Employer)

Dated \_\_\_\_\_ By \_\_\_\_\_  
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board's Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board's website: [www.nlr.gov](http://www.nlr.gov).

330 Second Avenue South, Towle Building, Suite 790, Minneapolis, MN 55401-2221  
(612) 348-1757, Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

**THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE**

THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE'S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (612) 348-1770.